The Impact of Iran’s Internal Weaknesses on Global Politics

Five years ago, on 3rd January, during Donald Trump’s presidency, Qassem Soleimani was killed by the US military in Baghdad. Qassem Soleimani was the commander of Iran’s Quds Force, the branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responsible for overseas operations. He was among the architects of Iranian influence and military strategy in the region. Three months before being targeted by a US drone on 3rd January 2020, Qassem Soleimani had delivered a confidential address to IRGC commanders, advocating for the expansion of a “qualitative” resistance alliance.

It seems as though Soleimani anticipated his death and wished to present a report on two decades of leading the Quds Force. In his address, he stated, “The IRGC has developed resistance in terms of both quality and quantity, expanding from an area of 2,000 square kilometres in southern Lebanon to 500,000 square kilometres. A successful ground connection has been established between the resistance—linking Iran to Iraq, Iraq to Syria, and Syria to Lebanon. Today, one can set off from Tehran and reach the southern suburbs of Beirut by car.” This resistance alliance was considered one of Soleimani’s significant achievements, but over the past year, this alliance has suffered severe setbacks.

Iran’s regional influence began to expand in the early 1980s when Tehran supported the formation of Hezbollah in Lebanon against the US and Israel. Later, the region’s instability provided Iran with opportunities to extend its influence, particularly after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the emergence of extremist groups like ISIS following the Arab Spring in 2011. Deploying the IRGC to Syria and supporting militant groups in Iraq and Lebanon helped Iran establish a territorial and regional link from its borders to Lebanon, extending to Israel’s doorstep.

Daniel Sobelman, a professor at Jerusalem’s Hebrew University, believes such a regional alliance was unlikely before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. He states, “The Iraq War enabled Iran to connect the dots—creating a route through Iraq, Syria, and onto Lebanon. This was crucial as Hezbollah in Lebanon was Iran’s most important ally in the region.” Meanwhile, Yemen’s civil war led to several cities falling under the control of rebels aligned with Iran.

In recent years, the resistance alliance also became a symbol of unity between Shia and certain Sunni groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, aiming to counter Western and Israeli influence in the Middle East. This alliance—which included Hezbollah, Iraqi militant groups, Yemen’s Houthi rebels, and the Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad—became a powerful weapon for Iran. Without this alliance, Bashar al-Assad’s government might have collapsed much earlier. Thus, the alliance created a “ring of fire” around Israel. Additionally, the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan further strengthened Tehran’s position and the resistance alliance.

During Trump’s first presidency, US National Security Adviser John Bolton remarked, “Iran successfully expanded the alliance while increasing its military strength.” According to him, “Iran did serious work in establishing the resistance alliance, which Soleimani described as the ‘ring of fire’ strategy around Israel. They invested billions, starting with Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes also saw significant advancements.”

Five years ago, Trump ordered the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, laying the groundwork for the decline of Iran’s resistance alliance. Now, as Trump returns to the White House, Iran finds itself at its weakest in two decades. During his previous presidency, Trump exerted considerable pressure on Iran, including reinstating harsh sanctions and withdrawing from the nuclear deal. Over the past seven years, these sanctions have exacerbated economic pressure on Iran. Soleimani’s death, coupled with this pressure, weakened Iran’s role in the region.

However, additional challenges arose after Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7th October 2023. The deaths of Hamas leaders and the weakening of its military capabilities in Gaza, along with the killings of commanders such as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut, have dealt a blow to Iran’s ability to challenge Israel. Hezbollah’s weakened military machinery, once Iran’s most powerful arm, has shifted the long-term balance of power in favour of Israel. For years, Hezbollah positioned itself as the strongest member of the resistance alliance. Now, the alliance’s very survival is being debated—a surprising development.

The Shift in Power: Iran’s Alliance Under Pressure Amidst Changing Middle Eastern Dynamics

The Resistance Alliance, which once tipped the scales of power in favour of Iran, now finds itself facing significant challenges. The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria—a regime described as a “key pillar of the Resistance camp”—has delivered a substantial blow to Iran’s regional alliance. The unexpected fall of Assad’s government is undoubtedly a major setback for Iran. Hezbollah, too, has suffered as missile and weapon supplies from Iran are now disrupted. Hezbollah, already under immense pressure from Israel, is now grappling with logistical challenges.

Many leaders of Iran’s alliance are no longer in place, and critical ground links have been severed, putting Iran in a difficult position. Apart from a few militia groups in Iraq, the Houthi rebels in Yemen are among the last significant allies left in the region. However, they, too, are under frequent attacks from the United States and Israel. Despite billions of dollars in investment and the loss of countless lives, the once-formidable alliance is now facing extraordinary difficulties.

Meanwhile, with Donald Trump potentially returning to power, there is speculation that if no deal is struck between the U.S. and Iran, the White House may shift its focus to China and Iraq. This could further restrict Iran’s oil revenues, intensifying its economic struggles.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a December statement, declared: “The more pressure that is placed on Resistance, the stronger it will become. The Resistance alliance will expand further.” His remarks suggest that Iran is determined to rebuild this alliance and restore its lost connections. Former Israeli intelligence officer Ibrahim Levin stated: “The determination for revenge within the Resistance alliance is at its peak. Despite losing Syria, Iran will attempt to regain access, possibly by engaging with the current leadership to secure the use of Syrian territory.”

The current Middle Eastern situation provides a critical juncture for political innovation. There may even be an opportunity to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict. Politicians are urged to seize this moment to analyse the outcomes of the conflict and explore alternative paths for a better future in the region.

Both Iran and Israel have claimed successful attacks on each other’s military targets, but the full extent and impact of these strikes remain unclear. While both sides acknowledge the attacks, they assert their resilience, yet global media remains restricted from accessing these areas, keeping the truth obscured. Iranian air defence forces recently stated that Israel launched attacks on its military bases in Tehran, Khuzestan, and Ilam provinces, which were “successfully repelled,” though limited damage occurred in some areas. Israel, on the other hand, has remained silent about any losses.

This standoff leaves the question: militarily, which side holds the upper hand? Iran and Israel are separated by approximately 2,152 kilometres of land. Iran has demonstrated its missile capabilities by successfully targeting areas within this range, showcasing significant advancements in its long-developed missile programme. Iran’s missile programme is regarded as the largest and most diverse in the Middle East. In 2022, U.S. CENTCOM General Kenneth McKenzie estimated that Iran possessed “more than 3,000 ballistic missiles.”

Conversely, there is no definitive confirmation of how many missiles Israel possesses. However, it is evident that Israel’s missile stockpile, built over the past six decades with support from allies like the U.S., makes it a formidable power in the region. Notable Israeli missiles include Delilah, Gabriel, Harpoon, Jericho-1, Jericho-2, Jericho-3, LORA, and Popeye. The backbone of Israel’s defence is the Iron Dome system, which has proven its effectiveness by intercepting rockets from Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israeli missile defence engineer Uzi Rubin describes the Iron Dome as an unparalleled short-range missile defence system.

On the other hand, Iran is significantly larger than Israel, with a population ten times greater. However, this demographic disparity does not necessarily translate into military superiority. Israel allocates substantially more resources to its defence budget, which is its greatest strength. Iran’s defence budget is approximately $10 billion, compared to Israel’s budget, which exceeds $24 billion.

Iran has a larger active military, with 610,000 personnel compared to Israel’s 170,000. However, Israel’s advantage lies in its advanced technology and superior air force. Israel has 241 combat aircraft and 48 attack helicopters, while Iran has 186 combat aircraft and only 13 attack helicopters. Although neither country has extensively showcased its naval capabilities, Iran has 101 naval vessels, compared to Israel’s 67.

Iran’s Missile and Drone Programme: A Regional Powerhouse

Since the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran has placed significant emphasis on developing its missile systems and drones. Over the years, the country has produced a variety of short- and long-range missiles and drones, which it is alleged to have supplied to its regional allies. Analysis of missiles fired by Houthi rebels at Saudi Arabia revealed that these were of Iranian origin.

Iran’s missile arsenal includes the Shahab-1, with a range of 300 kilometres, and its advanced version, Shahab-2, capable of reaching up to 500 kilometres. The Shahab-3, another iteration in the series, can strike targets as far as 2,000 kilometres away. Other notable Iranian missiles include the Zulfiqar (700 km range), Qiam-1 (750 km range), and the Fatah-110 hypersonic missile, which boasts a strike range of 300 to 500 kilometres.

According to the American Institute for Peace, Iran possesses the largest and most diverse ballistic missile stockpile in the Middle East. While the country does not have nuclear weapons, its ballistic missiles can reach targets up to 2,000 kilometres away, a capability that places it ahead of many regional rivals. Ballistic missile technology, first developed during the Second World War, remains a sophisticated field in which only a handful of nations have achieved self-reliance.

Despite facing decades of stringent international sanctions, Iran has managed to both acquire and develop ballistic missile technology. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei recently stated that the missile and defence programmes that the West fears so much were entirely developed during the sanctions period.

In 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution banning the sale of nuclear technology and material to Iran, including dual-use items that could be repurposed for military applications. Three months later, the Security Council extended the restrictions to include conventional arms and military technology. These sanctions affected not only Iran’s nuclear programme but also its ballistic missile ambitions, limiting its ability to procure weapons from countries like Russia and China, its traditional suppliers since the Iran-Iraq war.

Ballistic missiles are designed to carry nuclear warheads, and Western nations have expressed concern that Iran’s mastery of this technology indicates its continued efforts to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels.

The JCPOA and Its Aftermath

In July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was agreed upon between Iran and six major world powers, leading to the lifting of UN sanctions. However, the “snapback mechanism” within UN Resolution 2231 imposed a five-year monitoring period on Iran’s missile programme to prevent unchecked proliferation. Despite this, Iran’s missile development progressed, prompting the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to file a joint complaint with the UN in March 2016, accusing Iran of violating the resolution by conducting missile tests.

In 2020, former US President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, citing concerns over Iran’s missile programme and the lack of a robust inspection mechanism. Following the expiry of Resolution 2231’s monitoring deadline, Iran openly sought to purchase arms from Russia and China. However, continued sanctions have largely thwarted these efforts.

Today, Iran manufactures over 50 types of rockets, ballistic missiles, and drones, many of which have been employed in global conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran’s artillery had a range of just 35 kilometres, while Iraq possessed Scud-B ballistic missiles capable of hitting targets 300 kilometres away. Faced with these disadvantages, Iran initiated its missile programme.

In November 1984, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) established its Missile Command under the leadership of Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam. By 1985, Iran had acquired 30 Scud-B missiles from Libya, along with technical advisors who helped execute missile operations. The IRGC’s Aerospace Force established its first missile base in Kermanshah, and Iran launched its first missile attack against Iraq in 1985, targeting Kirkuk.

Israel-Iran Tensions: A Potential Conflict

While Iran has launched numerous missiles against Israel, Israel’s strength lies in its ability to conduct precision guerrilla operations, often with success. A direct war between the two nations seems unlikely, given Iran’s larger landmass and military personnel. Israel’s edge, however, lies in its advanced air force, missile systems, and drones, which it would likely deploy in the event of a conflict.

Over the years, high-profile Iranian military and civilian figures have been targeted in attacks widely attributed to Israel, although Israel rarely acknowledges its involvement outright. Both nations continue to prepare for contingencies, adding to the precarious balance of power in the Middle East.

Another aspect of this war could be cyberattacks, and in this regard, Israel appears quite vulnerable. The reason is clear: Iran’s defense system is not as advanced as Israel’s, making Israel’s system more susceptible to cyber-attacks.

The latest development is that after the fall of Syria’s ousted president Bashar al-Assad’s government last month, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has delivered four speeches on the future of his country, Syria, and the Middle East. The content of these speeches is as significant as the audience present. Among those listening to the Supreme Leader were Iranian soldiers, Iranian-backed militias, and supporters of the government. All of these individuals were in some way connected to the events of the civil war in Syria a decade ago. During the eight-year war against Iraq from 1980 to 1988, these Iranian soldiers had found their identity. In his recent speech, Khamenei addressed the families of the Iranian soldiers who had died in the region, whom the Iranian government refers to as ‘martyrs.’

In this situation, Ayatollah Khamenei is under pressure to answer his supporters in the absence of key figures like Hassan Nasrallah and Qasem Soleimani: Why did Iran intervene in Syria to defend the Assad government? Why was Syria not defended this time? And what will be the future of Iran’s ‘axis of resistance’? It appears that Iran has failed both militarily and diplomatically.

Most Iranian experts on international affairs agree that Iran must acknowledge its failure in regional conflicts, and that it is time for a new strategy. The Iranian government has become accustomed to the ‘etiquette of victory’, but now it must learn the ‘etiquette of defeat’. At the end of the war with Iraq, Iran’s then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini famously compared the acceptance of the ceasefire agreement to ‘drinking a cup of poison’. However, the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has not yet expressed such candour in his speeches, nor has he acknowledged the weakening of Iran’s strategy.

It is true, however, that he referenced the Prophet Muhammad’s ‘Battle of Uhud,’ one of the most significant battles in Islamic history, during his speech. In this battle, Muslims suffered a temporary defeat. Khamenei spoke about the early days of Islam, saying, “In the beginning of Islam, in the field of Uhud, Muslims suffered a great loss, and Amir al-Mu’minin Hamza was martyred. Amir al-Mu’minin Ali ibn Abi Talib was injured from head to toe. In this battle, the Prophet Muhammad himself was wounded, and many people were martyred. When they returned to Medina, the hypocrites saw this as a good opportunity to spread discord, and they began propagating lies to exploit the situation.”

It appears that the Iranian Supreme Leader is more concerned with the rising doubts among his supporters than with explaining the failure. After the setback in Syria, Iran’s position in the region seems weakened. Among the younger generation, there is growing concern about the support for the Islamic Republic of Iran. These are the same individuals who once identified themselves through regional wars and the ‘axis of resistance’. Many of the Iranian government’s supporters fear that what happened to the former rulers of Syria might be repeated in Iran.

On the fifth anniversary of Qasem Soleimani’s death, Ayatollah Khamenei attempted to address these concerns in his speech. He said, “One of the biggest mistakes made by some countries is removing the key factors of stability and sovereignty from the scene. (But) a group of young people is ready to sacrifice their lives. This is one of the most important factors of sovereignty in any nation. These factors should not be removed. This lesson is for us as well. Thanks to God, these factors are still safe here. Some other countries should also pay attention to this. They should know what their stability factors are. When these factors are removed, this is what happens in certain regional countries. When stability and sovereignty factors are removed, they become like Syria.”

In his speeches, the Supreme Leader has essentially invited his supporters to rally behind him during this challenging phase. Following the fall of the Assad regime, Khamenei’s first speech sought to answer public questions and concerns. He wants to assure his supporters that their doubts will be addressed and their morale will remain high. That is why, in just one month, he delivered his fourth speech on Iran’s strategy and the axis of resistance in the region.

Just three days after the fall of Damascus, the Supreme Leader gave his first speech, addressing the issue of Syria without any preamble. He said, “Those ignorant and misguided analysts who consider these events as weakening Iran should understand that Iran is strong, and it will become even more powerful. In reality, the current situation in Syria and the suffering are the results of the weakness and lack of spirit in the Syrian army’s resistance. In contrast to Syria’s weakness, the morale of the Iranian military’s senior officials is high.”

In all these speeches, the Supreme Leader avoided mentioning Bashar al-Assad by name. Over recent years, the relationship between Iran and Bashar al-Assad has not been as close as it was during the Syrian civil war. During the years of Syria’s reconstruction, and especially in the last four years, Bashar al-Assad had strengthened ties with Iran’s regional rivals, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia, due to economic pressures and harsh sanctions. Along with this, Israel’s repeated attacks and security issues in Syria have weakened the Iranian military presence there.

It seems that Ayatollah Khamenei fully understands that the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government marks the beginning of a new era for Iran. It is an era that will redefine the lines between friends, enemies, and the realities of war and threats. It remains to be seen whether Ayatollah Khamenei will ‘drink the cup of poison’ and negotiate with the West, or choose to accept defeat like the ‘Battle of Uhud.’