Shifting US Interests: A Lesson for Pakistan

Bagram Airbase was a strategic military base for the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, activated following the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. In July 2021, the US abandoned the base during its withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, it is once again becoming a focal point in global politics.

Recently, there has been discussion about reactivating Bagram Air Base, especially in the wake of US President Donald Trump’s return to power. According to reports, this step is not being taken against the Taliban in Afghanistan, but to monitor Pakistan’s nuclear assets.

Located 50 kilometres north of Kabul in Afghanistan’s Parwan province, Bagram Airbase spans 5,000 acres. Its runway is 3,600 metres long and features 110 hangars. It is situated at 2644.69 degrees east and 9469.34 degrees north. The base also includes accommodation for 3,000 troops. Originally built by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, the US transformed it into its central command centre during the Afghan War from 2001 to 2021. Following the US withdrawal in 2021, the Taliban took control of the base.

Bagram is just 250 kilometres from the Pakistani border and is a mere 15-minute flight from the Kahuta Research Laboratories, Pakistan’s primary nuclear facility. The base is also of immense significance to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which provides access to Central Asia via the Gwadar Port. Additionally, its proximity to the Iran-Afghanistan border (Nimroz province) makes it strategically important for Iran as well.

The pressing question is why the US, which had to rely on Pakistan’s assistance for a safe withdrawal from Afghanistan, is now eager to regain control of Bagram. What are its true motives, what secret ambitions does the Trump administration harbour, and why is the US Strategic Command becoming active once again?

Officially, the stated reason for wanting to regain Bagram is to counter the increasing terrorist activities of ISIS. However, it is worth noting that during a rally in March 2025, Trump remarked, “The only nuclear-armed rogue state near Bagram is ‘Bad Pakistan’, and we need Bagram back to keep an eye on the bad guys next door.” This statement laid bare Trump’s real intentions. US CENTCOM claims that Pakistan possesses 170 nuclear warheads, with 15% currently in Dera Ghazi Khan and 30% in Kahuta. Pakistan, however, has advanced MQ-9 drones capable of 24-hour aerial surveillance.

The US Strategic Command asserts that to counter these perceived threats, it needs to regain control of Bagram as a forward operating base. This would allow rapid deployment of US special forces, including Delta Force and SEAL Team 6, for potential operations targeting Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. The plan also involves linking Bagram with US military bases in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan) and the Gulf (UAE, Qatar). Oversight of this project has once again been assigned to security advisor Mike Waltz, who previously supervised operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Former Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth has also stated that neutralising Pakistan’s nuclear weapons using quantum computing and artificial intelligence requires a rapid response of 72 hours, something only feasible from Bagram.

Given the current regional dynamics, will the Taliban allow the US to use Bagram Airbase? Recently, the US government removed bounties on Afghan Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and two other senior Taliban leaders. This decision followed the Taliban’s release of American hostage George Gleizman, a sign of improving US-Taliban relations. According to Afghan Interior Ministry spokesperson Abdul Mateen Qani, the three individuals are closely related, with two being brothers and the third a cousin.

In contrast, a report from Voice of America stated that in January 2025, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that if more American citizens were held by the Taliban, the US would reinstate bounties on Taliban leadership, potentially exceeding the reward placed on Osama bin Laden.

While hardline Taliban leader Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada opposes granting any foreign country a military base, the more moderate faction led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar prioritises negotiations for economic benefits, including the unfreezing of Afghan assets. The US is reportedly willing to restore Afghanistan’s $9.5 billion in frozen assets as an economic incentive for access to Bagram. However, will handing over Bagram to the US allow the Taliban to maintain strategic trust with Russia and China?

As for Bagram Airbase, there is currently no indication that the US decision to lift bounties on Taliban leaders is linked to a deal regarding the base. Since the US withdrawal in 2021, Bagram has been under Taliban control, with no confirmed developments regarding its reactivation by the US.

Overall, recent US-Taliban engagements suggest that both sides are working towards improving relations by setting aside past hostilities. However, there is no confirmed agreement regarding Bagram Airbase. The Taliban, in an official statement, has assured that no foreign military base will be permitted in Afghanistan.

Regarding Pakistan, from 2001 to 2021, it facilitated 75% of US military logistics to Afghanistan. However, given its current strategic ties with China through CPEC, Pakistan appears reluctant to provide the US with access once again.

However, it is certain that Pakistan will strongly resist any project that aims to access Bagram via Pakistani territory. The protection of China’s $62 billion investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is directly linked to Pakistan’s national security. Furthermore, Pakistan suffered a massive loss of $150 billion and sacrificed over 75,000 lives by facilitating the U.S. after the 9/11 attacks. Yet, the U.S. openly betrayed Pakistan by disregarding its commitments and, instead, forging a civil nuclear deal with India’s arch-rival, thereby tacitly supporting India’s continued acts of terrorism within Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan has taken a firm stance, declaring that its sovereignty is non-negotiable.

Given this scenario, is the U.S. in a position to find an alternative route to reach Bagram?
It is important to note that in 2023, Uzbekistan granted the U.S. limited access to its Khanabad Air Base, which has a 3,000-metre runway capable of handling C-17 Globemaster aircraft. Similarly, the United States could use the Kokaydy Air Base in Tajikistan, which is just 350 kilometres from Bagram, equating to a 30-minute flight. Additionally, the U.S. has access to the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, the world’s largest American military base, hosting 11,000 troops. Moreover, the Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE serves as the primary hub for F-35 fighter jets and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.

If the U.S. attempts to enter Afghanistan’s Bagram Air Base without local cooperation, it will undoubtedly face significant military challenges. While the Taliban may lack advanced air defence systems such as the S-300 and HQ-9, they can still deploy handheld missile systems to resist any incursion. Additionally, Pakistan’s highly skilled air force retains the right to engage in defensive and retaliatory actions. Furthermore, the Taliban still maintain a force of 40,000 trained fighters who can launch a guerrilla war if necessary. According to Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, unauthorised entry into the sovereign territory of another state is strictly prohibited.

How feasible is it for the U.S. to seize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons under these circumstances?
First and foremost, it is crucial to understand Pakistan’s nuclear security. Pakistan has strategically decentralised its nuclear warheads, storing them in highly secure, undisclosed locations that are virtually inaccessible. These assets are safeguarded under a highly sophisticated Nuclear Command and Control System. The country employs a nuclear triad comprising land, sea, and air platforms, managed from secure underground command centres in Rawalpindi, Karachi, and Quetta, with over 10,000 elite military commandos dedicated to their protection. To counter potential cyber threats from the U.S., Pakistan’s National Command Authority has fortified its command-and-control systems using quantum encryption.

Despite these robust security measures, any attempt to attack Pakistan’s nuclear assets would trigger a military response under Pakistan’s Full-Scale Retaliation Policy. This doctrine explicitly warns of nuclear strikes against either India or the U.S. in the event of an assault, a stance that has already been communicated to the international community.

Would the United States make the mistake of attacking Pakistan?
It should be remembered that in 2011, under the pretext of the Arab Spring, the U.S. and its allies orchestrated the downfall of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. His only crime was pursuing an independent foreign policy to safeguard Libya’s sovereignty by shifting his nation’s trade and oil transactions away from the U.S. dollar. To remove him, a fabricated media campaign about alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was launched, which led to NATO’s military intervention. This resulted in a devastating civil war, reducing Libya—once a thriving and prosperous nation—to a state of perpetual chaos.

Pakistan’s adversaries appear to be following a similar strategy. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch insurgents have been assigned a clear objective: to attack Pakistan’s security forces and create nationwide unrest. This turmoil is then exploited to convince international media, particularly the U.S.-based Atlantic Council, to propagate reports questioning Pakistan’s nuclear security. The ultimate goal is to build a global consensus that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons pose a worldwide threat, thereby justifying a potential intervention by the U.S. and its allies.

Both Russia and China perceive this entire situation as a significant threat to regional stability. China, in particular, considers the security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets integral to its own national security. To defend CPEC, China has provided Pakistan with J-20 stealth fighter jets and HQ-9 missile defence systems. Additionally, Pakistan’s defence capabilities have been reinforced with advanced J-10 fighter jets, VT-4 tanks, and HQ-16 missile systems. Moreover, China’s colossal $1.35 trillion trade volume could act as an economic buffer, shielding Pakistan from U.S. pressure.

Meanwhile, Russia has been strengthening ties with the Taliban to counter any potential American aggression in Afghanistan. This includes supplying the Taliban with small arms and providing military training.

The critical question remains: Can the ‘Trilateral Alliance’ of the U.S., Israel, and India succeed in its regional ambitions? According to global defence analysts, such aggression is unlikely to succeed, as Pakistan’s nuclear security ranks as the fourth most robust in the world, making its deactivation virtually impossible. Unlike Libya, the U.S. would face mass public resistance in Pakistan, where 90% of the population remains staunchly opposed to American policies. Moreover, the Trilateral Alliance’s strategy of destabilising Pakistan through TTP and Baloch insurgents is likely to fail in the long run.

It is imperative that our leadership swiftly puts an end to political anarchy and embraces reconciliation. Only then can we stand as an impenetrable wall against all conspiracies targeting our homeland and achieve success in safeguarding our national interests.

To ensure the security of our nuclear assets, Pakistan’s God-given geographical advantage should be utilised by constructing deep underground tunnels—up to a thousand metres—within the Karakoram mountain range for their relocation. Additionally, Pakistan possesses an extensive network of waterfalls, which could be strategically employed for this purpose. China’s expertise in joint drilling operations should be sought for assistance in executing this plan.
The nuclear command system should be integrated with Chinese-manufactured quantum satellites to establish an unbreachable security framework. Defensive drills against nuclear attacks must be initiated to raise public awareness and preparedness.

A nationwide media campaign should be launched, with daily broadcasts on national television to inform and reassure the public about nuclear security measures. Furthermore, diplomatic efforts should ensure that China, Russia, and Turkey are prepared to exercise their veto power at the United Nations in Pakistan’s defence.

Past mistakes, such as the 2011 Abbottabad operation, must serve as a lesson to strengthen internal security and prevent any future breaches.

The United States’ interest in Bagram is not merely a military strategy but a geopolitical manoeuvre that threatens Pakistan’s sovereignty and regional stability. The ultimate goal is to pressure Pakistan into signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, Pakistan’s military readiness, strategic alliance with China, and credible nuclear deterrence serve as formidable safeguards against any foreign intervention.

The international community must respect Pakistan’s sovereignty and resolve conflicts through diplomacy and adherence to international law.