Syria’s Political Complexities and Future Predictions

After October 7 last year, the ongoing Israeli aggression in the region, coupled with the collusion of the United States and its allies, has shaped the current situation, leaving profound effects not only on regional countries but also on the international landscape. This sequence of events seems to be heading towards its logical conclusion, where attempts to transform the idea of Greater Israel into a reality are underway.

The pressing question arises: will this sinister triangle now turn its focus towards Iran and Turkey, eventually tightening its grip on Pakistan to target its nuclear capabilities? If these critical questions are not addressed with prudence, the dark clouds of compromise may drag us into a catastrophic storm, erasing us like straw in the wind. Undoubtedly, history would categorize us alongside those Muslim rulers who became lessons of humiliation, similar to our predecessors who were obliterated by Hulagu Khan’s forces. This fate befell them because they expended their energies on self-destruction for the sake of retaining power. (God forbid!)

It is noteworthy that the decline of two international powers, Iran and Russia, who supported Bashar al-Assad for years in suppressing the rebellion in his country, is also evident in this context. Even after Assad fled the country and a transitional government was established in Syria, analysts continue to scrutinize the causes behind the Assad regime’s downfall and its implications for the region. Some experts use the ‘Butterfly Effect’ theory to understand these events.

This theory illustrates how interconnected global events are, using the example of a butterfly flapping its wings, potentially triggering a storm in a distant location.

Political analysts, including former Israeli diplomat Meir Cohen, have linked the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria to Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel using the ‘Butterfly Effect’ theory. Cohen argues that the attack led by Yahya Sinwar with Iranian backing aimed to encircle Israel in collaboration with Hezbollah in Lebanon. However, Iran itself fell victim to this strategy. The decline of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance,’ which includes Hezbollah and Hamas, resembles a rolling snowball destroying everything in its path, with Assad’s downfall in Syria being a direct consequence. Cohen further asserts that this sequence will ultimately result in the downfall of the Iranian regime.

Another theory posits that Israel and its strong allies, including the United States, were not only aware of this entire plan but also actively exacerbated its vulnerabilities. By utilizing their pawns, they encouraged Hamas and its supporters to launch the October 7 attack. This served as a pretext for initiating subsequent actions to advance their sinister objectives, paving the way for the establishment of Greater Israel—a process we are witnessing now. In this context, Netanyahu’s ominous statement immediately after the Hamas attack should be recalled, where he warned that “even future generations of those responsible for these actions will bear the consequences, and Israel will achieve its ultimate goal.”

Meir Cohen believes it is now imperative for Israel, the United States, and Arab nations to develop a joint vision for the region’s future. Recent events have significantly impacted Iran, with large-scale protests within the country indicating this trend.

Meanwhile, in Palestine’s West Bank, protests have begun to remove Mahmoud Abbas’s government. There is also a risk that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt might exploit these developments, while Jordan’s government faces its own challenges.

On the other hand, Alia Ebrahimi, a researcher at Washington’s Atlantic Council, analysing Middle Eastern politics, agrees with Cohen’s assertion that the October 7 attacks are among the factors leading to Assad’s downfall. However, she emphasizes the psychological and military repercussions that bolstered the rise of Syrian opposition.

“We can observe a clear connection between the October 7 attacks on Israel and the collapse of Assad’s regime,” she states. Alia Ebrahimi also highlights other decisive factors in Assad’s fall, including Syria’s economic devastation, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s growing impatience with Assad, and Iran’s diminishing power post-October 7.

According to her, “At a time when Assad’s opponents appeared more united, organized, and determined than ever, Israeli actions against Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Syria further weakened the Syrian president.”

Alia Ebrahimi concludes that the ‘Butterfly Effect’ initiated on October 7 triggered a chain of unintended events. However, she cautions against ignoring psychological impacts. “Hamas demonstrated that even dominant powers have vulnerabilities, and the balance of power can shift at any moment. Syrian rebels were perhaps inspired by this, and similar phenomena could occur in other parts of the region.”

Political Analyst Yuval Stern on the Assad Regime’s Fall and the October 7th Attacks

Political analyst Yuval Stern also acknowledges the link between the fall of the Assad regime and the October 7th attacks. However, he disagrees with using the “Butterfly Effect” theory to explain this connection. According to Stern, the theory does not present the events in Syria and the region in the correct context. Any incident in one part of the region inevitably influences other areas. “Events in Syria cannot be isolated from occurrences in Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, and other areas.”

Stern believes that all forces involved in the region—including Iran, Turkey, the United States, Israel, Russia, and Arab nations—share certain common factors. Each of these countries plays a role throughout the region, making it highly complex. The “Butterfly Effect” is generally used where there is no clear connection between events. In contrast, there is a direct relationship between developments in the Middle East, which affect neighbouring Arab countries as well.

Abu Diab, a Lebanese researcher and an expert in international relations and geopolitics, does not ignore the impact of the October 7th events and the resultant fall of the Assad regime. However, he contends that the regime’s fall was not sudden but rather the outcome of a growing public rebellion that began in 2011, later escalating into a complex civil war. Forces stationed in Idlib since 2020 had been preparing for this moment. These forces, combined with internal, regional, and international changes, further weakened the Syrian government.

Rather than improving the situation, Assad chose to consolidate his rule. His regime’s involvement in the narcotics trade made Syria a major producer of Captagon. Although the salaries of Syrian soldiers were reduced, the plight of the missing and imprisoned individuals worsened, contributing further to the regime’s downfall.

The United States indirectly supported Assad’s regime in 2013 when he used chemical weapons. Prioritising discussions with Iran about its nuclear programme, the U.S. overlooked Assad’s actions. Israel also perceived the Assad regime as a lesser threat compared to others due to its adherence to the 1974 disengagement agreement concerning the Golan Heights. Israel preferred alliances with minorities in the region over a Sunni majority. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and reduced Iranian support created a security vacuum in Syria.

For its survival, the Assad regime continued to play a role in various disputes on both regional and international levels. While Bashar al-Assad tried to balance his relationships with Israel and Iran, he faced immense difficulties and failed to make decisive choices.

The rapid developments in the Middle East also brought significant changes to regional and international power balances, as well as among Assad’s allies. Despite close cooperation between Assad’s regime and Russia and Iran, differences persisted. With the arrival of a new U.S. administration keen on resolving the Ukraine crisis, Iran’s relevance to Russia in the region diminished, reshaping alliances. This situation placed Assad’s regime in a precarious position.

Now that the Assad family’s 55-year rule has ended, Ahmad al-Shara has emerged as a new figure. Al-Shara’s current role differs from his past as the leader of a jihadist movement linked to Al-Qaeda. As Commander-in-Chief, he has assumed responsibilities in the new Syrian administration. He is now prominent on the political stage, issuing reassurances at both domestic and international levels. With the declaration of an interim government in Damascus, diplomatic activities and visits from neighbouring countries have increased. Familiar figures are also reappearing, notably former Vice President Farouk, who had been absent from the political scene for years.

Looking forward, questions about Syria’s future are becoming more serious and challenging to predict. What will the potential scenarios be? Will external influence in Syria, supported by Turkey and the West, remain confined to Israel, or will a strong Arab alliance emerge in the future? What position will Iran and its allies hold in this context? Or are we witnessing the dawn of a new Middle East?

Mehdi Taeb, former deputy commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps in 2013, aptly described Iran’s relationship with Syria and the repercussions of Assad’s fall. He stated, “If we lose Syria, we cannot save Tehran.”

According to Israeli analyst Yuval Stern, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime will have significant negative effects on Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” in the region. Syria’s supply routes, crucial for maintaining this axis, have now been disrupted, making it difficult for Iran to send weapons to Hezbollah. Thus, Assad’s fall has eliminated a significant strategic threat to Israel. With the destruction of Syria’s military capabilities, including its navy, Israel has achieved a major objective.

Israel’s Strategic Efforts and Regional Dynamics: A Complex Political Landscape

Israel’s achievement of its strategic goals has been the result of years of dedicated efforts and a carefully planned approach to maintain dominance in the region. The unfolding situation was no sudden occurrence. Since 7 October of last year, Israel has concentrated its efforts on devastating Gaza and surrounding areas, playing a bloody game that turned the region into ruins. While engaging in occasional border skirmishes with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel avoided a full-scale conflict. Its defeat in a previous war against Hezbollah led Israel to meticulously prepare for future confrontations.

In its bid to weaken Hezbollah, Israel exploited Lebanon’s internal discord, using its agents to disrupt the Christian-Hezbollah alliance. It also tampered with Hezbollah’s advanced wireless communication systems by planting specialised chips in hundreds of walkie-talkie devices.

These allowed Israel to pre-empt Hezbollah’s strategies. When Hezbollah launched retaliatory rocket and drone attacks, Israel turned these very devices into tools of destruction, executing an inhumane operation. Subsequently, Israel escalated its airstrikes on Lebanon, pressuring the Lebanese government into an agreement. This accord resulted in the deployment of a weakened Lebanese military near Hezbollah’s positions, effectively safeguarding Israel’s borders.

Simultaneously, Israel continued its assaults on Syria. Following the escape of Bashar al-Assad, it seized control of the Golan Heights buffer zone and is now within 26 miles of Damascus.

Syria’s Uncertain Future

Political and defence analysts fear that Syria may face a situation akin to Iraq’s fragmentation. The challenges of forming a stable government in regions with ethnic and sectarian diversity, such as Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, are significant. International interventions have further complicated Syria’s internal dynamics. While it is challenging to predict Syria’s exact trajectory, ground realities suggest the involvement of a southern force rather than Ahmed Al-Shar’a’s faction entering Damascus.

Though Ahmed Al-Shar’a initiated significant momentum from Idlib, it is improbable that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham can govern Syria independently. The country’s diversity—whether political, sectarian, religious, or ethnic—makes singular dominance unlikely. Observers anticipate the establishment of a new government, potentially by March, followed by constitutional announcements and elections. However, the country is entering a complex and fragile transitional phase with uncertain outcomes. Despite these uncertainties, experts familiar with the region believe Syria will not follow Afghanistan’s model.

International Implications: Pakistan and Global Pressures

Meanwhile, Pakistan has come under renewed scrutiny due to US missile-related sanctions. The Biden administration’s measures against Pakistan, enacted following its own setbacks, are poised to create hurdles for the incoming Trump administration. These sanctions aim to exploit Pakistan’s ongoing political instability.

The “Triad” (the US, Israel, and India) appears determined to escalate Pakistan’s domestic political tensions into a broader conflict. Proxies from Afghanistan are actively engaged in terrorist activities within Pakistan. Recently, Pakistan launched airstrikes on internal terrorist sanctuaries in response to escalating threats, prompting an unwarranted protest from the Afghan government. Despite repeated evidence-based appeals by Pakistan to Afghanistan for action against these terrorists, the Taliban government’s dismissive stance suggests an anti-Pakistan agenda.

The adversaries’ ultimate objective is to foment discord between two Muslim nations, mirroring the devastating Iran-Iraq war. The aftermath of that conflict serves as a stark reminder of the perils of internal strife. It is imperative for Pakistan and Afghanistan to exercise restraint and address these challenges wisely.

The Taliban, too, must remember the divine principle of reciprocity: “Is the reward for good anything but good?” Mutual understanding and cooperation are essential for fostering harmony between the two nations.