Iranian Missile Programme: History, Development, and Current Challenges

In the pitch-black night, the golden dome of Al-Aqsa Mosque will likely never forget the scene of April 13, 2024, when for the first time, Iranian ballistic missiles and drones bypassed Israel and its allies’ famed defense system, the “Iron Dome.” They left their mark on Israeli airbases and various locations, demonstrating their reach. Six months later, on October 1, 2024, the attack was repeated with the declaration that it was in fulfillment of a promise made in response to the martyrdoms of Ismail Haniyeh and Hassan Nasrallah. This time, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards targeted a larger number of Israeli sites, warning that the next response could be non-conventional.

According to a researcher at the Stimson Institute and a former director of NATO’s Arms Control Program, “Iran’s recent attack has permanently altered the dynamics of the Middle East.” It’s worth noting that the Iranian missile program, which laid the groundwork for this attack, has developed over several decades at an astonishing pace, becoming so reliable and effective that it is now referred to as a “pointer.” This has caused the West to take it seriously and label it as a severe threat not only to Israel but to its other allies in the region.

Now, the entire focus has shifted to the threats posed by Iranian ballistic missiles in an effort to erase the aggression of Israel and its allies from the global landscape. How did Iran manage to develop such an advanced missile program despite severe international sanctions, and what types of missiles, with what ranges, does it currently possess?

According to the U.S. Institute of Peace, Iran possesses the largest and most diverse arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. Though it lacks nuclear weapons, its ballistic missiles can reach up to 2,000 kilometers. Ballistic technology was developed during World War II, but only a few countries in the world today have the capability to independently produce ballistic missiles. In 2006, the UN Security Council passed a resolution banning the sale of any nuclear technology or material to Iran, including items that could have military uses.

Just three months later, another UN resolution imposed a complete ban on the exchange of conventional arms or military technology with Iran. This also affected Iran’s ballistic missile program, making it impossible for Iran to buy weapons from countries like Russia and China, with whom it had been trading since the Iraq war.

However, Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei made it clear in a speech that “the missile program that worries the West was developed under these sanctions.” Over the past two decades, despite severe international sanctions, Iran has acquired this technology and produced ballistic missiles.

Ballistic missiles can carry nuclear warheads, and Western countries argue that since Iran has developed ballistic technology, it is unlikely to abandon efforts to enrich uranium to the level necessary to produce nuclear weapons. After the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement in July 2015, and the subsequent approval of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, all sanctions against Iran were lifted. However, the “snapback mechanism” retained restrictions on arms, particularly for five years, to monitor Iran’s missile program. This was intended to exert pressure on Iran and control its missile activities.

Iran expanded its missile program so much that in March 2016, the United States, the UK, France, and Germany sent a joint letter to the UN Secretary-General, accusing Iran of violating Resolution 2231 by conducting missile tests after the JCPOA agreement. Ultimately, in 2020, former U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement, citing concerns about the lack of inspection and verification procedures needed to address the threat posed by Iran’s missile program.

Although Iran tried to show that it remained a part of the JCPOA, after the expiration of the deadline in Resolution 2231, the Rouhani government advertised for arms purchases from Russia and China in October 2021. However, due to global sanctions, Iran has not yet succeeded in these efforts. Currently, Iran produces over 50 types of rockets, ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as military drones, some of which have been used in international conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine war.

During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran’s artillery had a range of just 35 kilometers, while Iraq had the “Scud-B” ballistic missiles, with a range of up to 300 kilometers, which targeted various cities within Iran. As Iraq gained the upper hand through missile strikes, Iran considered deploying missiles, and Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini authorized a missile response to Iraq’s attacks. In November 1984, under the leadership of Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh of the Revolutionary Guard’s Aerospace Force was responsible for establishing a missile unit, setting up the first base in the western city of Kerman, and launching the “missile command.” In 1985, Iran purchased Russian-made “Scud-B” missiles from Libya, along with technical advisors, marking the start of Iran’s missile operations.

The first missile attack by Iran on Iraq occurred on 21st March 1985, targeting the city of Kirkuk. Two days later, Iran launched another attack, this time on the Iraqi Army Officers’ Club in Baghdad, killing around 200 Iraqi commanders. Following these missile strikes, several Arab nations lodged strong protests with Libya, which led to the departure of Libyan advisors from Iran. Before leaving, the Libyans also disabled the missile systems and launch equipment. In the aftermath, a group of Iranian Air Force members began testing the missiles themselves. This small team from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) started dismantling the missiles and launchers, reverse engineering them in the process.

Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam, often referred to as the “Father of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s missile programme,” was featured in a documentary titled “Zero to One Hundred Missile Programme.” The film showed that, after the departure of the Libyan advisors, 13 members of the IRGC were sent to Syria for training on Scud ballistic missiles. Within a short period, they had successfully understood the operation of these missiles. In 1986, Moghaddam was appointed as the missile commander of the Iranian Air Force, and by 1988, the IRGC had seriously embarked on its own missile development efforts.

According to William Alberque, a researcher on global security and technology at the Stimson Institute and former director of NATO’s Arms Control Program, “During these years, China and North Korea also engaged in extensive cooperation with Iran on missile development. Later, Russia provided support for the expansion of Iran’s missile programme. It cannot be ignored that Iran, being technologically advanced, conducted effective research in reverse engineering, learning how to disassemble and reconfigure these missile components.”

In the 1980s, North Korea and later China assisted Iran with its missile programme. As a result, some global powers attempted to make China a member of the “Missile Technology Control Regime” (MTCR), an informal political agreement between 35 member states aimed at limiting missile production, development, and technology. While China did not agree to join the regime, it pledged to abide by its terms.

The “Nazaat” and “Mojtama” rockets were the first generation of missiles produced in Iran. Shortly after, Iran introduced the “Thunder-69” missile, essentially a redesigned Chinese short-range ballistic missile (B610), which the Iranian armed forces re-engineered with the help of an allied nation. The development of Iran’s missile programme began in the early 2000s under Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam’s supervision in the IRGC Aerospace Missile Unit, supported by then-IRGC Air Force commander Ahmad Kazemi. Their goal was to succeed in constructing more advanced technologies, such as ballistic missiles and satellite engines.

However, the second and more serious phase of Iran’s missile programme began with the production of the “Fateh-110” missile. Hassan Moghaddam was the most crucial figure in this programme’s development. In 2009, during a project, he successfully tested the “Extra Heavy Satellite Engine” series for the first time. According to key Iranian sources, Moghaddam, along with 16 others, was killed on 12th November 2011, in an explosion resulting from sabotage at a military base while preparing for a new missile test. Although the exact cause of the explosion was never determined, Moghaddam’s grave bears the inscription, “Here lies the man who wanted to destroy Israel.”

Today, under the leadership of Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the IRGC Aerospace Force is the largest entity responsible for missile and drone production for the Iranian armed forces. In recent years, it has taken over the responsibility for many of the Islamic Republic’s operations abroad, supplanting the traditional role of the Iranian military.

While Iran frequently showcases its missiles as a significant achievement in military production, the true extent of its missile development, as well as progress at its missile bases, remains largely unknown. According to the IRGC, they have numerous missile bases hidden deep within rugged mountains, engineered with sophisticated tunnelling systems. In 2004, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the IRGC Air Force, first discussed these missile bases, some of which are located as deep as 500 metres underground across various provinces of Iran.

Reliable information about the construction timeline of these underground missile bases is scarce. However, in an interview with Al Jazeera, Mehdi Bakhtiari stated that the first underground missile base was established in western Iran in 1984, at the inception of the missile programme. Iranian media and the IRGC have released several images of these underground missile bases, which they refer to as “missile cities.” The exact locations of these bases are unknown, and no official data is provided about them. Released footage shows some of these bases, including one which appears to be larger than the others, storing the IRGC’s most important missiles and drone weapons, alongside manufacturing and launching facilities. One video depicts hallways filled with missiles and launchers, with areas designated for launch preparations.

In March 2019, the IRGC unveiled a “Marine Missile City” on the coast of the Persian Gulf. As with previous disclosures, the exact location was not revealed, but local media in the Hormozgan province reported on the base. IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hussein Salami described this complex on the Persian Gulf coast as one of several strategic missile storage facilities for the IRGC Navy, where missile and launcher systems are housed.

The precise number of Iran’s underground missile bases remains unknown, but in January 2014, Iranian Ground Forces Commander Ahmad Reza Pour dastan announced that these underground missile cities are not exclusive to the IRGC, and the Iranian Army owns several as well. Amir Ali Hajizadeh has also confirmed the existence of three underground missile factories in Iran. The Iranian armed forces, particularly the IRGC Aerospace Force, manufacture a wide range of rockets, cruise, and ballistic missiles.

The ballistic missile is the most important type of missile developed in Iran. A ballistic missile flies at high altitudes in an arc. It has three firing stages, and in the second stage, its speed reaches approximately 24,000 kilometres per hour. Long-range ballistic missiles exit the Earth’s atmosphere after being launched and re-enter at speeds faster than the speed of sound. Cruise missiles are fully guided and have the ability to fly at low altitudes, making them capable of evading radar. The speed of a cruise missile starts at 800 kilometres per hour.

Iran possesses four types of missiles: rockets, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and hypersonic missiles. These four groups of Iranian-made missiles primarily consist of surface-to-surface and surface-to-sea missiles. However, defensive system missiles are also included in Iran’s arsenal, with some being produced by Russia and China and others developed by Iran’s own armed forces. In April 2024, during its missile attack on Israel, Iran used the “Emad-3” ballistic missile, the “Paveh” cruise missile, and the “Shahed 136” drone. However, Iran’s state media also claimed that a “Khaybar Shikan” ballistic missile was launched.

The Emad missile is an improved version of the Qadr ballistic missile. In 2015, the Emad, a medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 1,700 kilometres, was unveiled. It is 15 metres long and carries a 750-kilogram warhead. The “Paveh” missile was unveiled in February 2023. It is part of a family of medium-range cruise missiles with a range of 1,650 kilometres and is said to be capable of reaching its target through various routes. The Paveh missile group can communicate during the attack, and Iran claimed that this missile can reach Israel, which may be why it was chosen for the 13th of April attack, proving effective in that instance.

Currently, Iran’s missiles have a maximum effective range of 2,000 to 2,500 kilometres, meaning they cannot yet target European countries. Iran’s armed forces have claimed that this range limit follows Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s directive that, for the time being, Iranian missiles should not exceed 2,000 kilometres. After this directive, the development of long-range missiles was halted. According to Ayatollah Khamenei, there is a “reason” behind this decision, though he has not disclosed it.

The “Zulfiqar” is another short-range (700 kilometres) ballistic missile used in 2017 and 2018 to attack ISIS positions. This missile is 10 metres long, has a mobile launch platform, and is claimed to possess radar-evading capabilities. Another improved version, the “Zulfiqar 10,” carries a warhead weighing 450 kilograms.

According to global security expert William Albarque, Iran has a solid missile manufacturing capability, and the development of its missile programme has evolved by borrowing missiles from other countries and reverse-engineering them. They have transitioned from liquid-fuel to solid-fuel rockets and missiles. The accuracy of their missiles has dramatically improved, making Iran’s missile programme one of the most advanced for short- and medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles. In recent years, close military cooperation between Iran and Russia has allowed Iran to learn from Russian expertise, gaining access to more advanced missile designs, technologies, and capabilities in exchange for this collaboration.

Iran has also claimed that its new generation of missiles belongs to the hypersonic category. Hypersonic refers to weapons that typically travel at speeds five to twenty-five times the speed of sound. Iran first introduced the “Fattah” missile as both a ballistic and cruise hypersonic missile. The “Al-Fattah” hypersonic missile has a range of 1,400 kilometres, and the IRGC claimed that it can evade and destroy all missile defence systems. The “Al-Fattah” belongs to a generation of solid-fuel missiles with speeds reaching up to 13 to 15 Mach before hitting the target. Mach 15 equates to a speed of five kilometres per second.

At the unveiling ceremony for the Al-Fattah missile, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Organisation, stated that “this missile can travel both at high speed and inside and outside the atmosphere.” He also claimed that “the Fattah cannot be destroyed by any missile.” After the unveiling of the Al-Fattah ballistic missile, a billboard was erected in Tehran’s Palestine Square, threatening Israel, with the message “Tel Aviv in 400 seconds.” In response to this hypersonic missile threat, Israel’s Defence Minister Yoav Gallant remarked, “Our enemies are boasting about their weaponry, but we have superior responses to any technology, whether on land, in the air, or at sea.”

Four months after the unveiling of the Al-Fattah 1, the IRGC introduced the Al-Fattah 2, capable of reaching targets 1,500 kilometres away, with the ability to fly at very low altitudes and change its route multiple times during flight. This missile was unveiled during Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s visit to the Ashura University of Aerospace Sciences and Technologies, which is affiliated with the IRGC. However, no details regarding its range were published. Although Iran introduced the Fattah missile as a threat against Israel, it did not use these missiles in the 13th April or 1st October attacks.

In the past decade, Iran has become involved in regional conflicts for various reasons and has carried out cross-border operations against opposing groups, parties, and countries from its territory. All of Iran’s overseas operations have been conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Air Force, which has taken on the responsibilities of engaging in and responding to conflicts, effectively replacing the regular military in these roles. Although the IRGC’s foreign branch, the Quds Force, has been present in locations ranging from Afghanistan to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, etc., since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, its presence or actions have not been officially acknowledged as Iranian responses.

Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the first attack launched from Iranian territory against another country occurred in Deir ez-Zor, Syria, targeting ISIS. This operation, dubbed “Laylat al-Qadr,” was a response to ISIS’s attack on the Islamic Council. During it, six Zulfiqar and Qiam medium-range ballistic missiles were fired at ISIS headquarters from Kermanshah and Kurdistan. Subsequently, seven Fateh-110 missiles were used to target the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran in Queshnaj, located in the Iraqi Kurdistan region. The IRGC announced that this was a retaliation for the July 2017 attack on the Sayyid al-Shuhada Hamza base in Marwan.

On October 9, 2017, the IRGC launched the “Ashura Attack” operation in response to the armed forces parade attack in Ahvaz, destroying ISIS positions along the Euphrates River with six Qiam and Zulfiqar missiles, along with the aid of seven combat drones. On January 18, 2018, in retaliation for the death of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani at the hands of the United States in Iraq, the IRGC Air Force fired 13 Fateh-313 and Qiam-2 ballistic missiles at Ain al-Asad, the largest U.S. military base in Iraq. An attack was also launched on a base in Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan region of Iraq. Following Soleimani’s death, the intensity of Iran’s missile attacks on neighboring countries increased. In March 2022, the IRGC fired 12 Fateh-110 ballistic missiles at the home of Buzkarim Buzhinji, which Iran claimed was one of Israel’s “strategic centers” in the Kurdistan region.

The following year, the IRGC Air Force targeted the headquarters of Iranian Kurdish parties in Iraqi Kurdistan with Fateh-360 missiles during operations named “Rabee 1” and “Rabee 2.” In January 2004, the IRGC attacked the home of an Iraqi businessman, which it identified as the headquarters of Mossad, while also targeting ISIS and Turkistani Party bases in Idlib. On January 16, 2024, the IRGC Air Force targeted a residential area in the border village of “Sabz Koh” in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, hitting a base of the Jaish al-Adel group with missiles. The following day, Pakistan retaliated by firing missiles at several locations in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchistan province. This was the first time a country responded directly to Iran’s missile attacks. In response to this tension, Iranian Foreign Minister visited Pakistan, and later an official visit by the Iranian President helped normalize the situation.

After an Israeli missile attack on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus, which resulted in the deaths of Iranian general Mohammad Reza Zahidi and six other IRGC officers, Iran launched an operation called “Wahdat al-Sadiq,” targeting various locations in Israel with hundreds of drones, cruise, and ballistic missiles. Iran claimed that this attack targeted the Novatim Air Base in the Golan Heights and the Syrian Hermon Base.

According to global security researcher William Albrecht, while there was some observable decrease in the ability of Iranian missiles to hit their targets during the attack on Israel, Iran gained significant insights regarding Israel’s defensive capabilities and those of other countries aligned with Israel that are involved in countering Iranian missiles.

Before the Iranian Revolution, Iran’s largest ally was the United States, from which most military equipment, primarily fighter jets, were purchased. Iran acquired 160 F-5 fighter jets, designed as economical options for countries unable to afford expensive fighters. During the Pahlavi regime, Iran also procured a substantial number of McDonnell Douglas F-4 fighter jets, which are still part of its air fleet. The Shah of Iran then decided to replace them with a new fighter aircraft, purchasing 60 F-16 Tomcat jets. At that time, Iran was among the countries with the largest number of fighter jets in the Middle East.

Following the Islamic Revolution and the attack and takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, relations between Iran and the United States were severed permanently. Various American sanctions, including arms embargoes, targeted Iran, making it impossible to acquire modern weapons and combat aircraft. During the war, Iraqi ballistic missiles targeted Iran extensively, leading Iran to decide to initiate a rocket program. Thus, the missile program emerged as an optimal choice for Iran, serving as a defensive weapon that could reach other countries in times of conflict.

Consequently, Iran’s missile program is currently regarded as one of the most advanced and significant weapon programs in the country. According to researchers in global security and related technologies, these missiles serve as an excellent alternative to fighter jets, requiring less training and fewer pilots and being easier to launch. Now, Iran can independently produce missiles, which are also much cheaper than combat aircraft. There are many reasons why Iran is pursuing missiles.

As Iran’s knowledge of missiles and its arsenal continue to grow day by day, the scope of regional conflicts and tensions is also expanding. Although many experts believe that Iran has thus far managed to evade missile strikes against countries in the region, it remains to be seen how far the strategic patience of Western and Middle Eastern countries will go. On the other hand, will Iran be compelled to reconsider its missile program and extend their range? This raises a moment of concern for Israel and its allies regarding how seriously they take this issue.