China’s Global Military Diplomacy: Challenges, Opportunities, and Progress
China's Naval Power and Its Strategy on the Global Stage
Trump’s re-election and his cabinet nominations, contrary to his campaign promises, have sparked new waves of concern not only in the Middle East but across the globe. These nominations signal a clear intent to implement policies, particularly against China, which he couldn’t fully execute during his first term. However, many in China view Trump as an amusing figure, with memes of his dances circulating on social media. A Chinese political analyst remarked, “I find Trump amusing, but he’s erratic. Who knows what he might do?”
Trump has nominated Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, who has already declared Beijing a defining threat for this century. He has also selected Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor, who wrote earlier this month that the U.S. must swiftly resolve conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East to focus on the real threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party.
This has led global analysts to warn that China is already preparing for Trump’s second term. Despite widespread apprehensions, Trump’s return isn’t entirely surprising to China. It is expected that come January, when Trump assumes office, the world should brace for volatility in U.S.-China relations. Even before Trump’s re-election, tensions between the two nations had intensified. Under Biden, the imposition of tariffs on Chinese goods, geopolitical disputes over Taiwan, and differences regarding the Ukraine conflict added to the strain.
Amidst all this, dialogue between the two nations has continued. Several senior U.S. officials have visited Beijing, and Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed willingness to collaborate with America’s new leadership. In his last meeting with Biden, Xi cautioned Washington against a “new Cold War,” emphasizing that such a war would be unwinnable. Xi further declared, “Blocking China’s progress is unwise, unacceptable, and doomed to fail.” Beijing has long accused the U.S. and its allies of attempting to impede China’s rise through tariffs, restrictions on advanced AI chip access, and military alliances in the South China Sea.
Lyle Morris of the Asia Society’s Centre for China highlights that Trump’s choice of Rubio and Waltz for key positions indicates an administration poised to adopt a more confrontational stance toward China. While Trump’s personal rapport with Xi could leave room for negotiations, his cabinet selections suggest a firm and aggressive policy approach. Both Rubio and Waltz perceive China as a direct threat to U.S. security and economic stability.
Many industrial groups in China fear Trump’s promises to impose heavy taxes on Chinese goods, which could significantly impact China’s exports—an essential pillar of its economy. Consequently, Chinese business circles appear to be gearing up for potential risks, though the precise direction of Trump’s policies remains uncertain.
In a historical context, the Temple of Heaven in Beijing lies north of the Forbidden City, which housed China’s royal family for nearly five centuries. In 2017, President Xi hosted Trump here—a unique honor never extended to any other U.S. president since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Xi closed the area to the public for the occasion, offering Trump a personal tour. The visit was broadcast live on television, culminating in a dinner featuring Kung Pao chicken. A video of Trump’s granddaughter, Arabella Kushner, singing a Chinese song also went viral, symbolizing a high point in Sino-American relations.
However, this relationship soured in 2019 with the outbreak of COVID-19 from Wuhan, which Trump repeatedly dubbed the “China virus.” Trade tensions further escalated as Trump imposed $300 billion in tariffs on Chinese goods, marking the start of a retaliatory trade war.
As Trump begins his second term, he will face a stronger Xi Jinping, now serving his third term and likely to remain China’s leader for life. China already boasts the world’s largest land and naval forces, and Washington is increasingly alarmed by its rapid expansion of nuclear weapon stockpiles. While Trump announced his cabinet appointments, China’s state media aired a video showcasing its cutting-edge J-35A fighter jet at an air show, maneuvering sharply between skyward ascents and steep descents—a not-so-subtle display of its growing military prowess.
China’s Military Developments and Strategic Diplomacy: A Rising Global Power
China is now the second country in the world, after the United States, to possess two cutting-edge stealth fighter jets in its fleet. The world’s first two J-20S stealth aircraft were also displayed at an exhibition recently. Last week, researchers from California’s Middlebury Institute of International Studies analysed satellite images indicating that China is working on nuclear propulsion for a new aircraft carrier. Tong Zhao, from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that such advancements raise serious concerns regarding China’s evolving “first-use” policy, where nuclear weapons could be employed preemptively in a crisis.
According to Zhao, “Unless Trump himself takes an interest in such matters—which seems unlikely—both nations may find themselves on the brink of a fierce nuclear arms race, impacting global stability.”
Under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has adopted an increasingly assertive stance, particularly regarding its claims over the South China Sea and Taiwan. The U.S. is now more alarmed, fearing that China might be preparing for a military attack on Taiwan, which Beijing considers a breakaway province destined for reunification. Will the U.S. defend Taiwan under Trump’s leadership? This question is often posed to every American president. Trump, however, offered a different perspective, stating that he would not use military force because President Xi knows that he is “crazy” and that any aggression would lead to severe tariffs on Chinese imports. Despite Trump’s statements about avoiding foreign conflicts, most experts anticipate that Washington will continue providing military aid to Taipei.
Firstly, the U.S. is legally bound to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan. Secondly, Trump’s administration has sold more arms to Taiwan than any previous administration, with strong bipartisan support to sustain military aid. Thus, it is unlikely that Trump will significantly alter the sale of weapons to Taiwan.
Increased Sino-American Tensions Amid China’s Expanding Military Diplomacy
Over the past two years, amidst escalating political tensions with the U.S., Beijing has ramped up its global military diplomacy. This trend is particularly evident in its engagements with Russia, the Asia-Pacific region, and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) partner countries. Since January 2023, after China abandoned its “Zero-COVID” policy, there has been a surge in high-level meetings, military exchanges, goodwill visits, joint naval exercises, and training sessions. A review of activities from January 2023 to October 2024 highlights significant expansion in China’s military outreach.
These engagements include senior Chinese officials meeting foreign counterparts, goodwill visits, and other military events, excluding joint military exercises. Data from official sources, such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Daily, Huanqiu Wang, and China’s Ministry of Defence website, reveal that between January 2023 and October 31, 2024, China executed a deliberate strategy to amplify its activities for achieving its objectives.
China conducted 148 military diplomatic activities in 2023 and 169 by October 2024, offering crucial insights into its strategy. Over the past two years, China and Russia engaged in 11 meetings, six military exercises, and six goodwill visits. Nearly half of these activities involved high-level meetings between Chinese and Russian forces, complemented by six joint drills and six port calls. This uptick reflects the evolving “no limits” partnership announced in 2022, underscoring shared interests in countering U.S. influence and maintaining regional and global security—particularly in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war.
China’s military diplomacy has also intensified with Vietnam and Cambodia, ranking them second and third after Russia in terms of engagements. Military diplomacy with Vietnam included nine meetings, nine military-level exchanges, and three goodwill visits, while Cambodia saw three goodwill visits and two training sessions. With its close ally Pakistan, China prioritised meetings over military events. Similarly, despite U.S. efforts to encircle China through the Quad alliance and its active collaboration with India, senior Chinese officials have maintained meetings with both Indian and American counterparts.
South Africa has been engaged in meetings and goodwill visits with China, while Indonesia has primarily conducted goodwill visits. Before COVID-19 in 2019, China held three high-level military meetings with North Korea, attended by Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. However, since lifting its COVID-19 restrictions, China has not publicly resumed military diplomacy with North Korea, reflecting a stagnation in their relations. Experts suggest that China is taking this approach to avoid Western sanctions that might arise from indirectly supporting Russia through North Korea.
On 6 October 2024, marking the 75th anniversary of China-North Korea relations, China sent Zhao Leji, a senior Communist Party leader, to Pyongyang. However, no military leaders from either side participated in the event. North Korea’s absence from the 2024 Xiangshan Forum, an annual security summit it typically attends, was notable. Similarly, China’s last military activity with Iran occurred in April 2022, when then-Chinese Defence Minister Wei Fenghe met with then-President Ebrahim Raisi. Since then, no public bilateral military diplomacy has taken place, although Iran participated in joint naval exercises with China and Russia in March 2023 and March 2024.
China is actively strengthening its military relations with key ASEAN nations to solidify its dominance in the South China Sea. Despite disputes with Vietnam and Indonesia, Beijing maintains military diplomacy with both countries, which are significant Asian trade partners. Laos and Cambodia, considered China’s closest political allies, are among the five ASEAN nations with which Beijing has focused its military engagements, alongside Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia.
In 2024, China’s military diplomacy activities were predominantly concentrated in Asia and Oceania. Nearly half of its military engagements in Europe were with Russia. However, significant meetings also took place with the United Kingdom, Belarus, Serbia, and France. Following a maritime law enforcement agreement with Russia’s Federal Security Service in April 2023, Chinese coast guard patrols increased in 2024. Joint air, naval, and coast guard patrols between China and Russia expanded across the Bering Sea, the North Pacific, the Arctic, the Pacific, and the Northwestern Pacific during this period.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has rapidly risen to prominence in Chinese military diplomacy, now ranking second only to the PLA itself. Beyond patrols and training, the PLAN has expanded its goodwill efforts through port calls and medical missions, offering free healthcare via its hospital ships. By October 2024, it had conducted 22 port calls and 12 medical visits, compared to 17 port calls and eight medical visits in 2023. Naval missions in the Gulf of Aden have further enhanced China’s goodwill activities, boosting its capabilities and safeguarding its developmental interests. Typically, China deploys three fleets to protect its sea lanes from piracy and ensure the safety of international shipping, but in 2024, only one mission was stationed in the Gulf of Aden. Analysts view this as a strategic shift in Chinese naval operations.
This strategy allows a naval fleet to remain in the region for an extended period, supported logistically by China’s base in Djibouti. Globally, China has been hosting conferences, forums, sporting events, air shows, parades, and defence exhibitions to enhance its soft power. These activities have increased in 2024 compared to 2023. Between January 2023 and October 2024, China hosted a total of 16 such events, including nine in 2024 alone. It also sent military representatives to 18 international events, including three defence exhibitions and five air shows, primarily held in Asia, Oceania, the Middle East, and Africa.
While China claims to have eradicated poverty, millions of workers and factory labourers who contributed to its rise are now worried about what lies ahead. China’s future, as well as its economic stability, could partially depend on how serious Trump is about tariffs on Chinese goods. According to experts, Beijing is better prepared this time for any eventuality.
“China has already begun diversifying its sources of agricultural imports, particularly from Brazil, Argentina, and Russia, while increasing its export volume to non-US allied countries,” analysts note. Additionally, the recent restructuring of local government debt domestically is paving the way to mitigate the negative impacts of a potential trade war with the Trump administration.
The United States has invested billions of dollars in China, including:
2023: $126.91 billion in direct investments
2022: $122.21 billion in direct investments, a 9% increase from 2021
2021: $116 billion in direct investments
2020: $116.51 billion in direct investments
The United States’ direct investments in China are led by manufacturing, wholesale trade, and finance and insurance. China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States was $28.7 billion in 2022, a 7.2% decrease from 2021.
Notably, billionaire Elon Musk, a close ally of Trump, is among the stakeholders in this investment. His company Tesla heavily relies on China, where nearly half of its electric vehicle components are manufactured. Chinese leaders may consider whether American investors, including Musk, could influence Trump’s trade policies.
However, the great power struggle of the 21st century is not limited to trade. President Xi’s vision includes making China the world’s dominant power. Some experts believe that this is where another Trump presidency could provide Beijing with an opportunity to realise Xi’s ambitions. Certainly, China’s strategy of advancing incrementally could help it achieve this goal.